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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











a/k/a Yerris Ramirez-Nunez, 
 
                       Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-09-cr-00509-1) 
District Judge:  Honorable Juan R. Sanchez 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 15, 2010 
 
Before:  AMBRO, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  November 22, 2010) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Yerris Martinez-Nunez pled guilty to one count of reentry after deportation in 
violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2), and the District Court sentenced him to 
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forty-one months in prison.  On appeal, Martinez-Nunez challenges the District Court’s 
consideration of his prior conviction for attempted robbery at sentencing and its refusal to 
grant a downward departure or variance based on the alleged over-representation of his 
criminal record.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
I. 
 We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of the case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
 Martinez-Nunez is a citizen of the Dominican Republic.  On November 10, 1998, 
he was arrested for attempted robbery in New York.  According to the arrest report, 
Martinez-Nunez and a co-defendant entered an apartment and attempted to rob a victim 
at gunpoint.  Accordingly, on June 26, 2000, Martinez-Nunez pled guilty to attempted 
robbery in the second degree in the Supreme Court of Queens County, New York.  He 
was sentenced to a two-year term of imprisonment.  After serving his sentence, 
Martinez-Nunez was deported to the Dominican Republic on November 19, 2002. 
 At some point thereafter, Martinez-Nunez illegally returned to the United States, 
and on June 4, 2009, he was arrested by agents of the United States Bureau of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement inside an apartment in New York City.  On 
July 28, 2009, a grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania returned an 
indictment charging Martinez-Nunez with one count of reentry after deportation in 
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violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2).  He pled guilty to the indictment without a 
plea agreement on September 8, 2009. 
 The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) calculated Martinez-Nunez’s 
offense level at twenty-four, consisting of a base offense level of eight and a sixteen-level 
enhancement based on his prior conviction for attempted robbery.  U.S.S.G. 
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).  He was placed in a criminal history category of II as a result of the 
prior conviction for attempted robbery.  He received a three-level reduction for timely 
acceptance of responsibility, and thus the recommended guideline range at offense level 
twenty-one and criminal history category II yielded forty-one to fifty-one months.  
Martinez-Nunez objected to application of the sixteen-level enhancement and argued that 
it substantially over-represented the seriousness of his criminal history and the likelihood 
that he would commit other crimes.  Notwithstanding Martinez-Nunez’s objections, the 
District Court adopted the PSR’s guideline calculation and sentenced him to forty-one 
months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release.  The District Court also 
issued a $500 fine and a $100 special assessment.  Martinez-Nunez timely appealed. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  We have plenary review 
over a District Court’s decision to apply a strict categorical approach when classifying a 
prior conviction as a violent crime.  See United States v. Lennon, 372 F.3d 535, 538 (3d 
Cir. 2004).  We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard and review a sentence for 
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reasonableness, which requires that the sentence be both procedurally sound and 
substantively reasonable.  United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2008). 
III. 
 Martinez-Nunez raises two issues on appeal.  First, he contends that the District 
Court erred in applying a sixteen-level enhancement based on his prior conviction for 
attempted robbery.  Second, he alleges that the sentence is both procedurally and 
substantively unreasonable.  We will address each contention in turn. 
A. 
 On appeal, Martinez-Nunez argues that the District Court erred in classifying his 
prior conviction for attempted robbery as a crime of violence, thereby sustaining the basis 
for a sixteen-level enhancement.  Specifically, Martinez-Nunez argues that the District 
Court should have deviated from the categorical approach generally endorsed by this 
Court and considered:  (1) the statutory definition of the offense; (2) the original charging 
document; and (3) the transcript of the plea colloquy.  This argument is contrary to settled 
law. 
 Martinez-Nunez was sentenced under § 2L1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines for 
unlawfully entering or remaining in the United States.  Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) of the 
Sentencing Guidelines provides for a sixteen-level enhancement for a defendant who was 
previously deported after “a conviction for a felony that is . . . a crime of violence.”  A 
“crime of violence” is defined as an “offense under federal, state, or local law that has as 
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an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person 
of another.”  U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n.1(B)(iii). 
 A sentencing court is required to take a categorical approach when deciding 
whether a conviction is for a crime of violence.  Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 
602 (1990); United States v. Stinson, 592 F.3d 460, 462 (3d Cir. 2010).  In other words, a 
sentencing court “must look to the statute that [the appellant] was convicted of violating, 
to see whether the crimes therein described qualify as crimes of violence.  If so, the 
enhancement is proper.”  United States v. Otero, 502 F.3d 331, 335 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 Here, Martinez-Nunez was convicted under New York law of attempted robbery 
in the second degree in violation of §§ 110.00 and 160.10.  Section 160.10 provides, in 
relevant part: 
“A person is guilty of robbery in the second degree when he forcibly steals 
property and when: 
 
1. He is aided by another person actually present; or 
 
2. In the course of the commission or the crime or of immediate flight 
therefrom, he or another participant in the crime: 
 
(a) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant 
in the crime; or 
 
(b) Displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, 
machine gun or other firearm.” 
 
N.Y. Penal § 160.10.  The District Court properly concluded that attempted armed 
robbery in the second degree constituted a crime of violence under the categorical 
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approach because each violation of the statute requires proof that a defendant “forcibly 
[stole] property.”  Id. 
 We apply the categorical approach “unless (1) the language of the particular state 
statute at issue invite[s] inquiry into the underlying facts of the case, or (2) the disjunctive 
phrasing of the statute similarly invites inquiry into the specifics of the conviction.”  
United States v. Siegel, 477 F.3d 87, 90-91 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).  
Martinez-Nunez argues that these facts fall within the “narrow range of cases” where the 
sentencing court should look to information beyond the statutory definition of the 
offense.  See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.  This argument lacks merit.  The District Court 
properly classified attempted robbery as a crime of violence and was not required to look 
beyond the elements of the crime.  Thus, we reject Martinez-Nunez’s first contention. 
B. 
 Martinez-Nunez next argues that the District Court acted unreasonably in 
imposing a sentence of forty-one months.  Specifically, Martinez-Nunez argues that the 
District Court should have found that his criminal history category over-represented his 
criminal record and warranted a downward departure or variance pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
§ 4A1.3(b)(1). 
 First, Martinez-Nunez challenges the denial of a downward departure.  “We do not 
have jurisdiction to review discretionary decisions by district courts to not depart 
downward . . . [unless] the district court’s refusal to depart downward is based on the 
mistaken belief that it lacks discretion to do otherwise.”  United States v. Jones, 566 F.3d 
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353, 366 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Vargas, 477 F.3d 94, 103 (3d Cir. 
2007)).  The transcript from Martinez-Nunez’s sentencing hearing demonstrates that the 
District Court considered his objection and was well aware of its authority to grant the 
downward departure.  Accordingly, we defer to the District Court’s judgment. 
 Second, Martinez-Nunez alleges that his sentence is procedurally and 
substantively unreasonable.  Specifically, he argues that the District Court failed to 
adequately consider and apply the sentencing factors in § 3553(a), and failed to credit 
mitigating factors such as the length of time that passed between Martinez-Nunez’s 
conviction for attempted armed robbery and illegal reentry.  Procedurally, a “sentencing 
court is required to give ‘rational and meaningful consideration’ to the relevant § 3553(a) 
factors.”  United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 769 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States 
v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc)).  The record here is clear that the 
District Court gave “meaningful consideration” to the relevant sentencing factors and 
weighed those factors against any allegedly mitigating considerations.  Id.  The sentence 
is therefore procedurally reasonable. 
 Substantively, the “final sentence, wherever it may lie within the permissible 
statutory range, [must be] premised upon appropriate and judicious consideration of the 
relevant factors.”  Doe, 617 F.3d at 770 (quoting United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 
197, 204 (3d Cir. 2006)).  A sentence is not rendered unreasonable simply because the 
District Court “fail[ed] to give mitigating factors the weight a defendant contends they 
deserve.”  United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 546 (3d Cir. 2007).  The District Court 
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addressed Martinez-Nunez’s age and family status, his criminal history, his presentation 
of a false driver’s license when he was arrested, and the facts and circumstances 
underlying his conviction.  (App. 41-44.)  The District Court then imposed the minimum 
sentence recommended by the Guidelines − forty-one months − which we may afford a 
“presumption of reasonableness.”  See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007). 
 Because Martinez-Nunez’s sentence is both procedurally and substantively 
reasonable, we will affirm the District Court. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the sentence of the District Court. 
